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As part of the 2025 CLIFF Final Conference, attendees were given the chance to submit a poster as part of a poster competition. You can view the submitted posters here.

In November 2025, we welcomed experts, policymakers, and researchers to Amsterdam for the final CLIFF conference: “New Narratives for Leaving Fossil Fuels Underground.” It was an incredible three days of intense, necessary, and inspiring discussions on the politics, finance, and justice dimensions of the energy transition. We are thrilled with the level of engagement and the success of the event. A huge thank you to all our speakers and attendees who contributed to these vital conversations. Below, we have compiled a visual recap featuring photos from the various keynotes, panel discussions, and the lively poster sessions

Conference Statement Thank you to all who attended the 2025 conference, Climate Change and Fossil Fuels: New Narratives. The conference asked: What is the role of big investors in leaving fossil fuels underground (LFFU)? What are the North-South implications of LFFU? And what measures can be taken, and by whom, to equitably allocate and accelerate shareholder and stakeholder responsibility in energy transformation for inclusive development? We have the following five key messages. 1. Phase out fossil fuels nowUnless the global economy drastically decarbonises, the carbon budget to have a 50% chance of achieving the 1.5°C objective will be depleted by 2028. Plans to overshoot the target and offset emissions later must be minimised to avoid causing further significant harm to societies and ecosystems (noting that warming at and beyond 1°C already causes significant harm). Since the burning of fossil fuels is the root cause of climate change, phasing them out is in the interests of the vast majority of people, as well as the non-human world. Until 202, fossil fuels were not mentioned in the international climate regime. Restricting fossil fuel supply must be a priority for international climate policy. 2. Without climate justice, LFFU is impossibleClimate change and fossil fuels are a justice issue. In the North-South context, historically responsible rich countries continue to invest in fossil fuel at home and abroad. The fossil interests that have benefited from fossil capital are intertwined with ongoing imperialist dynamics that lock the Global South into debt, which in turn fuels their reliance on fossil exports. Without a just approach that centres these structural asymmetries, and without enabling the Global South to phase out fossil fuel by making alternatives available and affordable for all, LFFU will be impossible. Within countries and regions, climate injustices also unfold across diverse sectors, groups, and contexts. Hence, local-to-global justice is a necessary condition of LFFU. 3. LFFU requires dismantling the power structures and incentives that drive fossil fuel expansionA complex architecture of states, institutions, companies, and legal-economic arrangements facilitates and locks the global economy into fossil fuel extraction, production and use; LFFU necessarily implies broader structural change to address these drivers. Perverse subsidies for fossil fuels that prop up their profitability, the pervasive influence of fossil interests in shaping policy (there was one fossil lobbyist for every 25 participants at COP30), and international treaties that discourage proactive decarbonisation are just some of the factors perpetuating fossil hegemony. Without addressing these structural drivers, states, companies, and other fossil investors will continue to seek short-term profits at the expense of the fundamental conditions of life on the planet. Given these conflicting incentives and their record of denial, disinformation, and climate-delay tactics, relying on corporations and financial institutions to credibly drive climate action is a fairytale. 4. Catalysing action to LFFU is underwayClimate change cannot be addressed by symptomatic incremental measures; nor can it be addressed by market-based mechanisms that rely on the same logic driving fossil use and production. Fortunately, many different actors are challenging the fossil empire with various creative tactics. Civil society has taken fossil interests to court – and won – putting pressure on states and corporations. Global pressure is mounting: this year the advisory opinions of three relevant international courts reaffirmed the responsibility of states to meet their international climate obligations and defined fossil fuel expansion as a wrongful act under international law. Building multi-scalar alliances between the movements questioning the structural drivers of inequality and climate harm, such those for tax and debt justice, can catalyse action to LFFU. 5. Powerful narratives can support action to LFFUPart of the success of fossil interests is tied to how they control the narrative on fossil fuels; they disseminate doomist accounts claiming that moving away from fossil fuels will inhibit economic growth, employment, and development. Countering both these narratives and their obstruction of climate action requires compelling alternatives. These cannot merely refute fossil disinformation tactics but must also articulate visions of a post-fossil future which speak to popular realities and challenges of the majority. We are inspired by how social movements have taken on this challenge and we join them in calling for a better world without fossil fuels. We can all play a role in this fight — it is time to leave fossil fuels underground! Endorsed by Prof. dr. Joyeeta Gupta Luc van Vliet, University of Amsterdam The CSDS team Paula Haerle, University of Amsterdam Luis Scungio, SOMO Michele Betstill, University of Copenhagen Federico Sibaja, Recourse Nicholas King, Independent Environmental Futurist David Emiliano Guo Fei, University of Amsterdam Ciprian Piraianu, University of Amsterdam Enrico Macciotta Ana Xambre Pereira Valentina Couceiro Tim van der Vooren, University of Amsterdam Kirsten Dunlop, Climate KIC Hebe Verrest, University of Amsterdam Mirte Jepma, University of Amsterdam Maien Sachisthal, University of Amsterdam Jeska de Jong Rhodante Ahlers, Environmental Services Anna Aretha Sach, University of Amsterdam Michel den Elzen, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Georgios Dikaios, University of Amsterdam Jolanda Robinson, University of Amsterdam     stay up to date Interested in our latest results? Sign up for the newsletter. Contact About The CLIFF project was financed by the European Research Council (ERC) Advanced Grant under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme.   Grant agreement: No. 101020082 Quick Links Home About the project Research CLIFF Conference Contact Contact +31 20 5254366 J.Gupta@uva.nl Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, 1018 WS Amsterdam

Joyeeta Gupta On 23rd July 2025, the International Court of Justice issued its unanimous advisory opinion on climate change, to the case referred to it by the UN General Assembly. However, individual judges went beyond the consensus to also make specific points. This simplified summary highlights the key unanimous decisions: While, the advisory opinion is explicit on state responsibility, the adoption of 1.5℃ as the main consensus temperature target, and the kind of remedies available, it did overlook a few issues, which the declarations and statements of individual judges clarify. For example, the Right to Development is not really addressed, although both the Principles under the Climate Change Convention were mentioned as well as Human Rights instruments. Moreover, there was little reference to trade and investment law, although one of the judges emphasizes the challenges of investment law for climate action (e.g. regulatory chill). Some judges wanted a more detailed exploration of what ‘stringent due diligence’ means in terms of fossil fuel. They state: “Thus, the stringent due diligence obligations to implement such NDCs and to prevent significant transboundary harm require States to adopt and enforce regulations consistent with reducing global dependence on fossil fuels, including by phasing out production and use of fossil fuels and subsidies and transitioning away from fossil fuels, inter alia, by taking account of downstream consequences and regulating in a manner that does not undermine global co-operation.” There is also some critique about the hesitation of the unanimous opinion to go beyond saying that harm to others is not allowed to also say who is more vulnerable to harm and who is causing the harm. To watch the judgement, go to: THE HAGUE – The International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivers its Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change | UN Web TV See also: https://www.volkskrant.nl/buitenland/internationaal-gerechtshof-landen-zijn-verplicht-alles-te-doen-tegen-beangstigende-klimaatverandering~bfa58eb0/

By Dr. Lina Xie Dr. Lina Xie is a lecturer and researcher at the University of Groningen whose interests lay in public financial institutions and climate finance, and who studies the interaction between financial decisions and climate change and related implications. Her academic profile can be found here. Large-scale public interventions are needed to address climate change and to fund low-carbon and resilient development. The financing gap for the energy transition is major; the IEA estimates that financing the energy transition requires as much as $2 trillion (current levels are around $900 billion) invested annually this decade, and $4 trillion annual investment from 2030 (IEA, 2021, 2022). Beyond energy investment, finance is urgently needed for other aspects of climate mitigation and adaptation, particularly for developing countries. Public financial institutions (PFIs), as government-backed entities with official mandates to serve public policy objectives, are crucial investors in facilitating and mobilising such funds for tackling climate change. Since PFIs are public institutions, there is more space for them to be used as atypical climate policy instruments by governments, providing authorities with an interesting avenue for climate action, on top of more traditional policies (such as e.g., subsidies, emissions trading schemes, carbon taxes). However, there is scant academic research on PFIs’ climate actions and impacts, particularly for extensive samples. Since PFIs can be used to help mobilise the enormous amounts of funds required to bring about climate transition and to facilitate climate-resilient development, it is imperative to empirically investigate the presence and significance of PFIs in the financial system and how they engage with climate change. Examining how this potential role for PFIs can be leveraged to address the climate crisis was the focus of my recently accepted doctoral thesis. Through my research, I examine the landscape of PFIs in the financial system, looking not only at those with a pronounced climate orientation (e.g., public climate funds and green banks) but also at development financial institutions, public banks and state-owned investors that mainly provide conventional financing. Among the 789 PFIs domiciled in Germany, Japan, the UK and the US, that I studied, a textual analysis of these PFIs’ reports found only a modest climate focus, suggesting that the potential for these institutions to finance the transition remains untapped. I argue that to unlock this potential, it is necessary to offer appropriate guidance and regulations that enable the effective use of these resources. Yet many PFIs do allocate funding to climate finance, and my research also aimed to study how effective that finance is in meeting the recipient countries’ mitigation and adaptation needs, focusing particularly on multilateral development banks (MDBs). The needs-based allocative efficiency of MDB climate finance is estimated with data envelopment analysis (DEA). By assuming the climate finance allocation is in proportion with the country’s CO2 emissions and vulnerability level, DEA analysis yields a set of efficiency scores: a country that received a higher volume of climate finance (output of MDBs’ allocation decision) with a given level of CO2 emissions and vulnerability (input of MDBs’ allocation decision) has a higher efficiency score. The results reveal that currently, MDB climate finance prioritises mitigation over adaptation and concentrates in a small number of relatively wealthy countries. Adaptation projects face more barriers than mitigation projects to access fundings from the private sector and extremely rely on public financing. Following the current allocation that prioritising mitigation may pose significant risks, particularly for the most vulnerable countries. Therefore, I examine the long-term climate consequences of rebalancing the distribution of MDBs’ mitigation and adaptation finance by predicting future emissions and vulnerability under different allocation scenarios. The prediction is based on the association between countries’ CO2 emissions and received mitigation finance and the association between the vulnerability index and received adaptation finance using historical data. With numerical simulation, a more equitable allocation between mitigation and adaptation (from 70:30 to 40:60) could substantially reduce global climate vulnerability, benefiting an additional 1.9 billion people, without significantly altering the annualised growth rate of emissions.  Adaptation is not only to protect against the unfolding negative climate impacts but also to avoid long-term damage to vulnerable communities and ecosystems. Similarly, mitigation is important to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement to avoid exacerbating vulnerabilities. This research highlights the importance of PFIs achieving a more balanced allocation between mitigation and adaptation, considering the dimensions of human health and well-being. Furthermore, I explore the interaction between PFIs and emissions in the context of different stages of economic development and financial development. Using the latest dataset on public development banks from Peking University, I gauge the share of PFIs in the economic (PFIs’ assets to GDP) and financial systems (PFIs’ assets to banks’ assets) of 111 countries. Through cross-sectional regression analysis, I aim to ascertain whether the differences in the share of PFIs explain variations in CO2 emissions across countries. I first incorporate the interaction term of PFIs and financial development into regression, which allows me to examine whether the influence of PFIs on CO2 emissions varies based on the level of the country’s financial development. Additionally, I conduct separate regressions for high-income countries and middle- to low-income countries to accommodate their differing economic development contexts. The regression results show distinct patterns between high-income countries and middle- and low-income countries. In high-income countries, PFIs contribute to a significant reduction in CO2 emissions growth, but this impact is moderated by financial development. This indicates that financial development may introduce alternative factors that offset the positive influence of PFIs on emission reduction efforts. However, CO2 emissions tend to increase with a higher share of PFIs in middle- and low-income countries. This positive impact of PFIs weakens and can even become negative when financial development improves, suggesting that with enhanced financial infrastructure, PFIs may pivot their focus towards funding mitigation. PFIs can play a dual role: funding fossil fuels that produce significant emissions and funding low-carbon technologies and infrastructure to mitigate emissions. This research emphasizes such complex relationships between PFIs, financial development, economic development, and CO2 emissions. Shifting PFIs’